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ABORTION LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Aroused by a national trend evident since 1959,1 South
Carolina has taken a giant step forward in the field of abortion law by legalizing therapeutic abortions in prescribed instances and under certain conditions. 2 Prior to January 29,
1970, when the law first took effect, all abortions committed
in South Carolina were illegal, unless necessary to preserve
life.3 Now, and during the interval between that date and the
present, those abortions performed in compliance with the
conditions enumerated in the new law are legal. Thus, the
change in South Carolina's abortion law is abrupt, particularly
since this state has historically adhered closely to the more
traditional common law standards in the area. The statutory
and case law which evolved from the Anglo-Saxon traditions
survive in South Carolina, and the new law must coexist with
it. This may lead to some difficulty for a very basic reason:
the old laws and the new law are products of different philosophies, different times, different movements. The old law was
based on the common law concept that nature (in this case
gestation) may not be interrupted through man's interference. 4 The new therapeutic abortion law is the result of a
movement which professes that human intervention may be
and is justified in some circumstances.5 It has been argued
that the old laws are the product of the nineteenth century
1. See Leavy & Charles, California'sNew Therapeutic Abortion Act: An
Analysis and Guide to Medical and Legal Procedure, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1,
1-2 (1968). See also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 207.11 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959),
230.3 (2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
2. Act of January 29, 1970, Statutes at Large No. 821 (codified at S. C.
CODE:

ANN. §§ 16-87 to 16-89 (Supp. 1970)).
S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-82, -83 (1962).

3.
4.
207, 208
5.

Wells v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 A. 126, 127, 191 Pa.
(1899).
Comment, Abortion Laws: A Constitutional Right to Abortion, 49

N. C. L. REv. 487, 489 (1971).
6. Note, Abortion Reform: History, Status, and Prognosis, 21

RPs. L. REv. 521, 528 (1970).
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tendency to legislate morals. 6 The modern trend in America
has led to an increasing acceptance of abortion, "though many
' 7
doctors and a majority of the public disapprove of the trend.
Thus, although disapproving of the trend, the majority does
not desire to enforce moral judgments through law as was
done in the past. The liberalized therapeutic abortion laws
may not mark the end of the modern trend to erode the old
criminal laws. There is currently a movement underway to
challenge the validity of the new laws on the grounds that they
invade a zone of privacy, i.e. marriage, family, and sex, in
which a woman has the fundamental right to determine
whether or not to bear children.8
Although the liberalized abortion laws have precipitated
a storm of controversy, this study will abstain from considering the merits of the diverse moral and ethical questions which
naturally arise. Recognizing that the controversy has evoked
great interest in South Carolina as well as the nation, the scope
of this article will be limited to 1) a survey of the law relating to abortion in this state, including the statutory and case
law as it evolved prior to the introduction of the therapeutic
abortion law, and 2) developments in federal courts which
could affect the future status of abortion law in South Carolina and the rest of the nation.

II.

SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA ABORTION LAW

Medicine and law differ over the significance of the term
"abortion." Unlike their medical counterparts, lawyers and
judges tend to equate "abortion" with "miscarriage." Technically, abortion is the termination of pregnancy "before the
time that a living child may possibly be anticipated." Miscarriage, on the other hand, is limited to pregnancies terminating between the 16th and 28th week.' The law has adopted
the common meaning of the word abortion as being "simply
a miscarriage, the premature delivery or expulsion of a human
fetus before it is capable of sustaining life."". A common
7. Legal Abortion: Who, Why and Where, TIME, Sept. 27, 1971, at p. 67.
8. See, e.g., People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P. 2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354 (1969).
9. 1 AM. JuR. 2d Abortion § 1 (1962).
10. B. S. MALOY, MEDIcAL DIcrIoNARY FoR LAWYERS 480 (3rd ed. 1960).
11. Commonwealth v. Smith, 213 Mass. 563, 566, 100 N.E. 1010, 1011

(1913).
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law misdemeanor, 1 2 abortion became a more serious criminal
offense when it was willfully procured without justification
or excuse.' 3 South Carolina's statutes distinguish between
two kinds of abortion. The first one reads as follows:
§16-82. Death resulting from abortion or attempted abortion.-Any
person who shall administer 'to any woman with child, prescribe for
any such woman or suggest to or advise or procure her to take any
medicine, substance, drug, or thing whatever or who shall use or employ or advise the use or employment of any instrument or other means
of force whatever, with intent thereby to cause or procure the miscarriage, abortion or premature labor of any such woman, unless the
same shall have been necessary to preserve her life or the life of such
child, shall, in case the death of such child or of such woman results
in whole or in part thereform, be deemed guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the Penitentiary for a term not more than twenty years nor less than five years.
But no conviction shall be had under the provisions of this section upon
the uncorroborated evidence of such woman.1 4

On initial inspection, it appears that this section encompasses
those acts which are done with the intent of artifically inducing a miscarriage, with death resulting to either the woman
or the child. 5 However, such an appearance here is misleading since the phrase, "in case the death of such child . . . results"'16 has been interpreted to limit the inclusive scope of the

word "child."' 7 A detailed examination of South Carolina
case law interpreting the two criminal abortion statutes will
follow a reproduction of the second crime as it appears in the
South Carolina Code. It reads as follows:
§16-83. Abortion or attempted abortion not resulting in death.-Any
person who shall administer to any woman with child, prescribe, procure or provide for any such woman to take any medicine, drug, substance or thing whatever or shall use or employ or advise the use or
employment of any instrument or other means of force whatever, with
intent thereby to cause or produce the miscarriage, abortion or premature labor of any such woman, shall, upon conviction thereof, be
punished by imprisonment in the Penitentiary for a term not more than
five years or by fine of not more than five thousand dollars or by such
fine and imprisonment both, at the discretion of the court. But no con12. 1 Am. JtR. 2d Abortion § 1 (1962).
13. Mississippi State Bd. of Health v. Johnson, 197 Miss. 417, 427-28, 19
So. 2d 445, 448 (1944).
14. S. C. CODE AxN. § 16-82 (1962).
15. S. C. CODE AN. § 16-82 (1962).
16. S. C. CODE AN. §§16-82 (1962).
17. See State v. Steadman, 214 S.C. 1, 51 S.E2d 91 (1948).
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viction shall be had under the provisions of this section upon the uncorroborated evidence of such woman. 18

Ostensibly, this second section makes the same acts described
in the first section criminal and punishable to a lesser extent
where death does not result to the woman or child. Like the
first section, the second section is a felony. 19
The leading case which interprets and distinguishes these
two statutes is State v. Steadman.20 That case began when the
defendant was indicted under two sections of the 1942 South
Carolina Code, those being the equivalent of the current sections 16-82 and 16-83, for allegedly performing an illegal abortion upon a woman. The indictment charged two counts, one
on each section. The defendant claimed that the two sections
provided for two separate and distinct crimes and that a verdict of not guilty should be directed under the first count,
based on section 16-82, since no evidence was presented by the
State to show that a child was killed. The trial court refused
this motion and the jury found the defendant guilty on the
first count. The South Carolina Supreme Court, per Chief
Justice Baker, held that the State had failed to present any
evidence that the woman upon whom the abortion was performed was quick with child, and, therefore, reversed the
case, since a directed verdict was in order as to the first count,
and remanded it for further consideration as to the second
count, based on section 16-83.
In determining that an essential element of section 16-82
is that the woman must be quick with child, the court in this
first Steadman case entered into a discussion of the crime as
it existed at common law, before it was converted into a statutory offense. The court pointed out that at common law section 16-82 was not termed "abortion," and section 16-83 was
not even a crime, so long as the pregnant woman assented to
the act. 21 What distinguished the criminal act from the non-

criminal act was the development of the fetus. If the act were
committed after the embryo had advanced to such a state that
it enjoyed a separate and independent existence, the mother
having felt the child move, alive within her womb, then the
18. S. C. CODE AxN. § 16-83 (1962).
19. S. C. CODE ANN. § 16-11 (1962).

20. 214 S.C. 1, 51 S.E.2d 91.
21. Id. at 7, 51 S.E.2d at 93.

19721

NoTEs

crime was committed. 22 Thus, the common law concept was
that life commences for the fetus at the moment it first moves,
rather than when conceived, or at some other moment prior
to birth.23 The court then traced this distinction down to the
current South Carolina statutes. It found that the distinction
24
between the two statutes rested on the common law theory.
In the statutory laws a more severe punishment is meted out
when the abortion is performed on a woman quick with child.
The reasoning behind this would be that it is more reprehensible to destroy that which has a life of its own, independent
and separate from the mother, than to destroy that which has
not exhibited any of the elements of life. With this in mind,
the court found that the word "child" means different things
in the two statutes. 25 In section 16-83, the crime with the
lesser penalty, "child" refers to the embryo in the early stages
of pregnancy, prior to quickening, which the court equates
with "separate existence." 26 Relying on this interpretation,
the court held that the State must present evidence of quickening before a conviction may be had under section 16-82, otherwise, an essential element of the crime will not have been satisfied.
It is worthwhile to note that the court in the first Steadman case refrained from stating that acts amounting to a violation of section 16-82 could be considered a fortiorialso violative of section 16-83.27 Such a determination would mean
that one who committed an act falling within the description
in section 16-82 could be convicted of violating section 16-83.
The court did not say that "child," as the term appears in section 16-83, means the fetus during the entire gestation period,
but only the embryo prior to quicking. This question was left
28
undecided.
One year later, the South Carolina Supreme Court had
occasion to review the retrial of State v. Steadman.29 In the
first Steadman case, the court reversed the trial court's find22. Id.
23. See State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52, 51 Am. Dec. 248 (1849).

24. 214 S.C. 1, 8, 51 S.E.2d 91, 94.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 8,51 S.E.2d at 94.
Id.
See State v. Hutto, 252 S.C. 36, 165 S.E2d 72 (1968).

29. 216 S.C. 579, 59 S.E2d 168 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1950),
rehearing denied 340 U.S. 894 (1950).
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ing that the defendant was guilty of violating the then equivalent of section 16-82 of the South Carolina Code. This result,
as previously mentioned, was grounded upon the absence of
evidence showing that the woman on whom the abortion had
been performed was quick with child, i.e., that the child had
a separate and independent existence. 30 At the second trial,
the defendant was convicted for violating that section of the
1942 South Carolina Code which corresponds to our current
section 16-83. 31 Mrs. Steadman appealed on various grounds
including procedural challenges and the contention that the retrial had made her subject to double jeopardy. The Supreme
Court, in a 3-2 decision, held that Mrs. Steadman had not been
placed in double jeopardy when she was retried on the second
32
count after obtaining reversal on the first count.
In the second Steadman case, the court addressed itself to
a controversial question of evidence. It began by stating the
general rule that, in a trial for a particular offense, evidence
of the commission of a similar, previous offense by the defendant is not admissible. 33 According to an exception adopted
by the South Carolina Court, however, evidence of similar offenses, not too remote in time, is admissible in order to lay to
rest any possibility that the abortion at issue was performed
for reasons of the person's health. 34 Thus, the court held that
the State could introduce evidence of similar past offenses,
but only to prove the essential ingredient of criminal intent;
the State has the burden of proving such intent by adequate
and substantial evidence in a criminal abortion case. 35 The
court added a caveat, however, by instructing that when the
defendant denies having committed the act itself, rather than
admitting the act and pleading lack of criminal intent, the trial
court, upon timely request, should clearly instruct the jury
that evidence of prior abortions or attempted abortions may
only be used to determine the accused's intent.3 6
30. 214 S.C. 1, 51 S.E2d 91.
31. S. C. CODE ANN. § 16-83 (1962).
32. 216 S.C. 579, 597, 59 S.E.2d 168, 177.
33. See 2 J.H. WIGMroR, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw §§ 302,
359 (3d ed. 1940).
34. 216 S. C. 579, 596-97, 59 S.E.2d 168, 176-77.
35. See State v. Sharpe, 138 S.C. 58, 135 S.E. 635 (1926).
36. 216 S.C. 579, 596-97, 59 S.E.2d 168, 176-77. See also State v. Doty,
167 Minn. 164, 165, 208 N.W. 760, 761 (1926). See generally 2 J.H. WInMoRE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 302, 359 (3d ed. 1940).
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The Supreme Court in the second Steadman case also decided that the trial court had not been in error when it would
not allow the defense to elicit the name of the father of the unborn child from a prosecution witness. The court reasoned that
there was no probative value to naming the father since the
37
paternity of the child was not at issue.
In the second Steamc n case, the defense also contended
that the conviction should be overturned since it relied on "the
uncorroborated evidence" 38 of the woman upon whom the alleged abortion was performed. 39 The question of what kind
of evidence satisfies the statutory requirement of corroboration of the woman's testimony had been raised in earlier cases.
In State v. Sharpe40 one of the defendants, having been convicted of performing an illegal abortion, contended on appeal
that the evidence of the victim was uncorroborated. The South
Carolina Supreme Court found there was sufficient corroboration afforded by the circumstances. The court said:
It is not necessary, under the law, before conviction can be secured in
cases of this kind, that some third party shall see the crimes committed.
If this were the law, conviction would be a matter of almost utter impossibility. The corroboration may come from words or acts of the
41
defendants, or from circumstances.

The issue of corroboration was raised again in State v.
Parsons.42 In that case the defendant appealed from his conviction on several grounds which included the contention that
the testimony of the woman upon whom the alleged operation
was performed was not corroborated. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected her claim and found corroboration. Citing an earlier case,43 the court found the statute to be satisfied by "'anything which tends to strengthen, add to, add
weight, or credulity, or that which makes more certain.'
",44

37. 216 S.C. 579, 599-600, 59 S.E.2d 168, 178-79.
38. S. C. CODE ANN. § 16-83 (1962). Note that S. C. CODE ANN. § 16-82
(1962) also requires some corroborating evidence other than the mere testimony of the woman upon whom the abortion is performed.
39. 216 S.C. 579, 600-01, 59 S.E.2d 168, 178-79.
40. 138 S.C. 58, 135 S.E. 635 (1926).
41. Id. at 73-74, 135 S.E. at 640.
42. 171 S.C. 449, 172 S.E. 424 (1934).
43. State v. Teal, 108 S.C. 455, 95 S.E. 69 (1918).
44. 171 S.C. 449, 453, 172 S.E. 424, 425. The South Carolina Supreme
Court cited State v. Teal, 108 S.C. 455, 95 S.E. 69, 70 (1918) and State v.
Sharpe, 138 S.C. 58, 135 S.E. 635 (1926) in support.

432

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

In the second Steadman case4 5 the court elaborated on the
question of what constitutes corroboration of the evidence of
the woman upon whom the abortion was allegedly performed.
The court stated that in such cases it isn't necessary that a
third party actually witness the commission of the crime.
Citing State v. Sharpe,4 1 the court added that it is only necessary that some corroboration come from the words or acts of
4 7
the defendants, or from the circumstances.
In the first Steadman case 4s the court seemed to clearly
distinguish section 16-82 from section 16-83. 49 The late Chief
Justice Baker succinctly stated that Section 16-82 applies
when the attempted or actual abortion is performed upon a
woman who is quick with child, she or the child dying as a result. The crime with the lesser penalty, section 16-83, should
apply in those cases "where a woman is aborted, or attempted
to be aborted, in the early stages of pregnancy and prior to the
time when it could be said that she was 'quick with child,' "0
and the woman does not die. Thus, according to this passage,
the element of quickening makes the two sections exclusive of
each other, and it should follow that an allegation of the elements of section 16-82 would not be sufficient as an allegation
of section 16-83 for indictment purposes. However, in State v.
Hutto the very opposite was held to be the law. 51
In the Hutto case the defendant was charged and indicted
under section 16-82. At the close of the State's case, the defense sought a directed verdict of not guilty on the grounds
that the prosecution had failed to show that the fetus had
quickened. The State then moved to amend the indictment so
that a violation of section 16-83 could be alleged. The trial
court judge denied the defendant's motions and granted the
State's motion to amend. The South Carolina Supreme Court,
per Justice Lewis, interpreted the first Steadman case as holding that "proof of guilt under Section 16-82 necessarily established all elements essential to conviction under Section
45. 216 S.C. 579, 59 S.E.2d 168.
46. 138 S.C. 58, 73-74, 135 S.E.2d 635, 640.
47. 216 S.C. 579, 599-600, 59 S.E.2d 168, 178-79. The Court also cited

State v.
48.
49.
50.

Parsons, 171 S.C. 449, 172 S.E. 424 (1934).
214 S.C. 1, 51 S.E.2d 91.
Id. at 8-9, 51 S.E.2d 93-94.
Id. at 9, 51 S.E.2d at 94.

51. 252 S.C. 36, 165 S.E.2d 72 (1968).
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-"52 The court went on to say that the amendment
16-83 ....
added nothing new to the indictment and did not allege a new
offense. 53 The court then noted that any objection that the
defendant may have had to the inclusion of two separate offenses in one count was waived since not made before the
swearing in of the jurors. 54 The court upheld the conviction.
In an effort to complete as much as possible of the survey
of South Carolina abortion law outside of the new therapeutic
abortion law,5 5 some additional points should be noted. Although the substantive offense of abortion can be committed
by one individual, South Carolina also recognizes conspiracy
to commit abortion. 5 6 South Carolina law also provides for
punishment of the woman in cases where she submits to any
operation intended to induce a miscarriage or where she takes
some drug or substance with that same intent. The applicable
statute deems a violation to be a misdeameanor punishable by
no more than two years imprisonment and/or a maximum fine
of one thousand dollars. The statute clearly includes as violations those instances where the woman attempts to perform an
57
abortion upon herself.
In conclusion of the survey, it should be noted that the
statute of limitations is two years for all prosecutions under
sections 16-82, 16-83, and 16-84. The statute begins to run
with the commission of the offense.58
With the introduction of its therapeutic abortion law, 50
South Carolina joined the national movement toward reform
of existing abortion laws. 60 The South Carolina version of the
therapeutic abortion exception allows a licensed physician to
recommend or perform an abortion 1) where the woman's life
52. Id. at 41, 165 S.E.2d at 74.
53. Id. at 42, 165 S.E.2d at 74.
54. Id. See S. C. CODE ANN. § 17-409 (1962). See also State v. Redmond,
150 S.C. 452, 148 S.E. 474 (1929).
55. S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-87 to 16-89 (Supp. 1970).

56. See State v. Wells, 249 S.C. 249, 153 S.E.2d 904 (1967).
57. S. C. CODE ANN. § 16-84 (1962).

58. S. C.

CODE ANN.

§ 16-86 (1962).

59. Act of January 29, 1970, Statutes at Large No. 821 (codified at S. C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-87 to 16-89 (Supp. 1970)).
60. See Leavy & Charles, California'sNew Therapeutic Abortion Act: An
Analysis and Guide to Medical and Legal Procedure, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1,

1-2 (1968).
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or mental or physical health is substantially threatened by the
continued pregnancy, or 2) where it can be established that the
child will likely be born with a severe mental or physical defect, or 3) where the pregnancy is the result of an alleged rape
or an incestuous relationship, in either case, timely reported to
local law enforcement authorities who must act in a designated
manner. 0 1 One of these three circumstances must be attested
to by "three doctors of medicine no one of whom shall be engaged in private practice with the other, one of whom shall be
the person performing the miscarriage . .. "62 The written
consent of the woman, or her guardian if she is a minor or an
incompetent, must be obtained. Unless there is an emergency
threatening the woman's life, the written consent of her husband must be obtained if she is living with him. The operation must be performed at a hospital licensed by the State
Board of Health, and the doctor's certificate must be submitted to that hospital in advance of the planned operation unless there is an emergency. 63 In addition, the doctor who performs the operation must report it on a standard form to the
State Director of Maternal and Child Health within seven days
following the abortion.6 4 The South Carolina law also provides
that any private physician or private or non-governmental
hospital may refuse to allow therapeutic abortions within its
institutions without threat of liability. 65
The effects of the new therapeutic abortion law in South
Carolina are not as yet discernable. In contrast, the New
York therapeutic abortion law has had enormous effects.66 It
is reported that 181,182 women obtained abortions in New
York during the first year its new abortion law was in effect. 67 It must be remembered that there is no residency requirement for women wishing to avail themselves of the New
York statute, 6 whereas in South Carolina, the woman must
have been in the state continuously for ninety days immediately preceeding the abortion. 69 The New York law allows her
61. S. C.
62. S. C.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

§

16-87 (Supp. 1970).

§ 16-87 (Supp. 1970).
§ 16-87 (Supp. 1970).

S. C. CODE ANN.
S. C. CODE ANN. § 16-88 (Supp. 1970).

S. C. CODE ANN. § 16-89 (Supp. 1970).
N. Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
Columbia Record, Oct. 15, 1971, at 5-A, col. 2.
N. Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKMnney Supp. 1969).
S. C. CODE ANN. § 16-87 (Supp. 1970).
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to obtain an abortion within the first twenty-four weeks of
her pregnancy simply by obtaining the consent of a licensed
physician.7 0 The New York State Health Department has
tentatively concluded that most women who have obtained
abortions under their new law are white, under the age of
twenty-five, and nonresidents.7 1 Considering that South Carolina's therapeutic abortion is far from being as liberal as New
York's, and that South Carolina requires ninety days continuous presence prior to the operation, it is doubtful that South
Carolina will experience a tidal wave of legal abortions as
New York has.
III.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

In recent years, cases challenging the constitutionality of
abortion statutes have been finding their way through the federal court system.7 2 The first of such cases to reach the United
States Supreme Court was United States v. Vuitch,73 testing
the constitutionality of a District of Columbia abortion
statute.7 4 The defendant had been indicted for procuring or
producing an abortion on a woman. The District Court judge
dismissed the indictment on the ground that the abortion
statute was unconstitutionally vague.7 5 The statute punishes
those who procure, produce, or attempt to procure or produce
an abortion on a woman, "unless the same were done as necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health and
under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner of
medicine .... -76 The District Court judge felt the words "as
necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health"
were not precise enough to avoid improper limitations upon
the physician's execution of his professional responsibilities
and were so vague that they interfered with "the woman's
right to avoid childbirth for any reason." 77 The Supreme
Court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague
70. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney Supp. 1971-1972).
71. Columbia Record, Oct 15, 1971, at 5-A, col. 2.
72. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) ; Doe v. Scott, 321
F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. I1. 1971); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex.
1970); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (ELD. Wis. 1970).
73. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
74. D.C.C.E. § 22-201 (1967).
75. 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D.D.C. 1969).

76. D.C.C.E. § 22-201 (1967).
77. 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034.
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and reversed the dismissal of the indictnent. 78 The Court, per
Justice Black, found that the exception incorporated into the
statute did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
show that the abortion was "necessary for the preservation of
the mother's life or health. ' 79 There is no presumption of
guilt since the prosecution must prove the defendant falls outside the exception."0 The Court also found that the term
"health" had been interpreted in a prior case,81 and that the
defendant was sufficiently informed of the charge against him
and, therefore, not deprived of due process.8 2 Justice Black
noted in closing that there were "other reasons" for dismissal
of the indictment offered by the defendant in the lower court.
83
Those arguments were based on Griswold v. Connecticut,
but the Court read the lower court's opinion as based on a void
for vagueness concept and did not reach those arguments.8 4
The Griswold arguments are based on the theory that
there is a "zone of privacy" protected by the Constitution, and
further, that this protected area includes the "fundamental
right of the woman to choose whether to bear children."8 The
Supreme Court may yet have occasion to inspect and consider
those arguments as there are three federal cases at various
states of appeal on the way to the Supreme Court.8 6 All three
of these cases adopt dicta from a California case, People v.
Belous, which basically states that a woman has a right to
choose whether to bear children during the early stages of
pregnancy up until that point in time in the development of
the fetus when the woman's right to choose gives way to the
state's interest in preserving life.8 7 In Doe v. Scott, a majority
78. 402 U.S. 62, 64.
79. D.C.C.E. § 22-201 (1967).
80. 402 U.S. 62, 70-71.
81. Doe v. Gen. Hosp. of the Dist. of Columbia, 313 F. Supp. 1170, 1174-75
(D.D.C. 1970).
82. 402 U.S. 62, 71-72.
83. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
84. 402 U.S. 62, 72-73.
85. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 24 954, 963, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359, 458 P.2d
194, 199 (1969).
86. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ili. 1971); Roe v. Wade, 314
F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D.
Wis. 1970).
87. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963-64, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359-60, 458 P.2d 194, 199-200.
See also Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1391; Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp.
1217, 1222-23; Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301-02.
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of a three judge panel herd the statute in question unconstitutional in part since "during the early stages of pregnancy-at
least during the first trimester-the state may not prohibit,
restrict or otherwise limit women's access to abortion procedures performed by licensed physicians operating in licensed
facilities."8 8 In Roe v. Wade a three-judge court found that
Texas abortion statutes interfered with the fundamental right
of the woman to choose in the matter of abortion.8 9 The panel
of federal judges noted that the Texas laws "sweep far beyond
any areas of compelling state interest." 90 The panel in Roe
did recognize that the state had a legitimate concern over the
"abortion of the 'quickened' fetus." 91 Similarly in Babbitz v.
McCann, a three-judge panel held a Wisconsin abortion law
unconstitutional. 92 That court balanced the relative interests
of the state and the pregnant woman and held that:
[A] woman's right to refuse to carry an embryo during the early
months of pregnancy may not be invaded by the state without a more
compelling public necessity than is reflected in the statute in question.
When measured against the claimed 'rights' of an embryo of four
months or less, we hold that the mother's right transcends that of such
an embryo. 9 3

Whether the United States Supreme Court will accept
these arguments and recognize such a protected status in
women is unascertainable. The Vuitch decision gives little indication of the leanings of the Court since it was concerned
there with other issues.9 4 Moreover, the late Justices Black and
Harlan, who participated in the Vuitch case, have been replaced by Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Thus, so drastic a
change in the make-up of the Court renders it near impossible to predict the outcome of those cases concerning the constitutionality of state abortion statutes.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the United State Supreme Court adopts the protected
status argument discussed previously, 9 5 the entire area of
88. 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1391.

89.
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91.
92.

314 F. Supp. 1217, 1222.
Id. at 1223.
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93. Id.
94. 402 U.S. 62.

95. 310 F. Supp. 293, 301-02.

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

abortion law will be overturned. In South Carolina our statutory law, including the therapeutic abortion statute,9 6 and our
case law would no longer be valid. If such were the case, a
woman could choose to have an abortion without fear of breaking the law. Perhaps her choice would be limited to the early
months of the pregnancy, in which case our South Carolina
law could be preserved at least in part. Our law which makes
it a crime to commit the act of abortion before quickening 97
would likely be invalid while the law addressed to abortions
committed after quickening9" might remain unaffected. The
new therapeutic abortion exception would be invalid in any
case.
If the Supreme Court turns down privacy arguments,
South Carolina law will continue intact. If this does indeed
occur, the distinction based on quickening will remain at the
heart of South Carolina abortion law, and the therapeutic
abortion exception will remain valid.
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